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1 Introduction
The housing boom of the early 2000’s in the U.S. culminated in the sub-
prime crisis of 2007–2009. The episode once again demonstrated the need
to understand the dynamics of house prices, housing debt, and their links
to the aggregate economy.
This paper presents a theoretical model of the housing market charac-
terised by aggregate over-investment in housing that explores the incen-
tives of households to take on debt over the house price cycle. The model
can also accommodate an endogenous boom-bust cycle in house prices.
I show that there is a trade-off that creates a non-linear relationship be-
tween house prices and participation in the credit market. Expectations of
high house prices first drive out the least creditworthy borrowers, as hous-
ing loans become more expensive. But eventually, the increasing capital
gains available on housing investment can dominate the increasing cost of
borrowing and draw back more and more risky borrowers. A low interest
rate environment also fuels participation by non-creditworthy borrowers,
as the cost of borrowing is less prohibitive. In this way, the model helps
understand the behaviour of households during the housing boom of the
early 2000s in the U.S., characterised by low interest rates and increasing
house prices.
The data on housing markets in the U.S. have a few salient features. Fig-
ure 1 shows the co-movement of new residential mortgage originations,
the mortgage delinquency rate, and subprime mortgage lending over the
house price cycle in the United States in 1990–2015. Starting from 1998,
house price appreciation picked up and peaked in 2006 at 30% above trend
before falling dramatically.
This dramatic boom-bust cycle in house prices was, however, accompanied
and even overshadowed by a surge in mortgage originations. They grew
from almost 70% below the sample mean in 1990 to 120% above mean
in 2003. The most impressive growth in originations coincides with the
period from 2000 to 2003, at the onset of the housing boom.
At the same time, the share of subprime mortgage origination was rela-
tively stable at around 10% of all mortgage originations until 2004, after
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Figure 1: Mortgage lending, delinquencies, and the house price cycle.
House prices: %-deviation from a linear trend; source: S&P Case-Shiller U.S. National
Home Price index. Subprime mortgages: % share of total mortgage originations; source:
Inside Mortgage Finance, collected from the Financial crisis inquiry report (2011) for years
1996–2008 and Zibel and Andriotis (2015) for years 2009–2014. Delinquency rate: % share
of all single-family residential mortgages; source: Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System. New mortgage originations: total volume of new single-family residential
mortgage originations, 1990–2010, %-deviation from sample mean; source: U.S. Federal
Housing Finance Agency.
which it rapidly expanded, peaked in 2006 with house prices, and col-
lapsed to virtually zero from 2009 onwards. Meanwhile, the delinquency
rate was stable at sligtly above 2% until 2006. As house prices started
to fall, delinquencies on mortgages started increasing and reached 11%
in 2009. They have remained elevated since then. This development in
mortgage delinquencies following the housing boom has widely been re-
ferred to as the U.S. foreclosure crisis (see e.g. the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (2011)).
In this paper, my aim is not to explain why this increase in supply hap-
pened, or to take a stance on whether it was welfare-improving or not.1
Rather, I abstract away from the details of the supply side and assume it
accommodates the demand for loanable funds. I study, first, the incen-
tives on the borrower side to enter the loan market and subsequently to
potentially default on the loan, given house prices. Second, I analyse how
these entry and default incentives can feed back into prices to create a
1The surge in subprime lending is related to a loosening of lending standards, as argued
e.g. by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011). As documented in their report,
the supply of subprime loans surged starting from the late 1990’s as a result of increased
securitisation and, at the extreme, even fraudulent lending practices.
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boom-bust cycle in the housing market.
I analyse these mechanisms using a model of asymmetric information in
the credit market. I model the housing market in a setting where the inter-
mediation of loans is inefficient because of an adverse selection problem,
modelled after the classic framework of De Meza and Webb (1987, 1990).
I assume fundamental house values are exogenous and heterogenous, but
endogenise the sales price of housing. This price reflects the true funda-
mental value of the housing stock, and there is no bubble element.
In order to talk about potentially harmful overborrowing, there has to be
a market failure that allows households to take on too much debt from a
social perspective. In such a context, overborrowing is naturally defined
as a deviation from a socially efficient equilibrium. Similarly, a loosening
or tightening of lending standards can be modelled as a deviation from the
first-best in lenders’ optimal decisions in terms of to whom, and at what
price, loans should be granted.2
In the model presented in this paper, all households are subject to two
shocks: a shock to house value, and an income shock. The former is
observable by all agents, whereas the latter is private information to the
borrower. The households also face two fundamental choices. First, they
must decide whether to buy or rent a home; they may need to borrow
to finance housing purchases, but their future income is uncertain at the
time of purchase. Second, after income uncertainty is resolved, they can
choose to default on their debt if they have any. Default acts as a form
of insurance against adverse house value and income shocks, induced by
market incompleteness and limited liability, but carries a deadweight loss
cost.
Optimal default decisions are affected by the joint probability of the two
shocks. Consequently, borrowers differ by their default risk in a way that
is unobservable to lenders. This particular information structure leads to
over-investment in equilibrium, and subprime borrowers are defined as
the set of borrowers who do get a loan under asymmetric information, but
2The term “lending standards” is used here to describe the behaviour of lenders under
asymmetric information, relative to their actions under symmetric information. The term
is used in a similar way in a host of literature concerning informational asymmetries in
the credit market; see e.g. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) and the references therein.
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would not if their types were publicly observable.
Asymmetric information gives rise to endogenous credit “constraints”:
some households self-select out of the credit market because borrowing
would be too expensive for them, given their income prospects. The house-
holds are not constrained by any hard limit on the amount of debt they
can or are allowed to take on, but rather by the price of borrowing. There
can still be overborrowing with respect to first-best, if too few choose to
stay out of the loan market.
Then, I extend the model to allow for an endogenous cycle in the house
price, even when fundamentals are unchanged, by introducing an aggre-
gate demand complementarity in the households’ preference for housing
consumption. This feature, coupled with large enough deadweight costs
on defaults, can create a deterministic boom-bust cycle even in the ab-
sence of aggregate uncertainty. These elements capture, first, the “hype”
surrounding homeownership during the boom phase, and subsequently,
the foreclosure wave that induces the bust phase.
The main results of this paper are two-fold. The first set of results comes
from a comparative statics exercise that explores participation and default
incentives in the cross-section of households. The second set focuses on
incentives over time to explain a boom-bust cycle in the housing market.
First, as the main contribution of this paper, I show using a comparative
statics exercise that there is a non-linear relationship between expected
house values and participation in the credit market. When future house
values, and thus prices, are expected to be low, participation is high. As
expected house values rise, the types with the lowest expected income first
opt out of the market because housing becomes more expensive. Eventu-
ally, expected capital gains become so attractive that the risky types enter
the market again as expected future house values rise further. Because the
borrowers are more levered, default becomes optimal if they are hit by an
adverse combination of income and house value shocks.
The relationship between safe interest rates and credit market participa-
tion is monotone: lower interest rates attract more borrowers, as outside
returns and borrowing costs are both low. I also demonstrate that tighten-
ing default legislation that affects all borrowers similarly is not an effective
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way to curb overborrowing. An effective policy must target incentives of
different types directly.
Second, I show that the model is capable of accommodating a determin-
istic cycle in house prices, and that qualitetively — in terms of relative
magnitudes and the timing of the cycles — these dynamic patterns match
the observed cycles in the U.S. data very well.
These results complement the evidence in a series of influential empir-
ical studies by Mian and Sufi (2009, 2011) and Mian et al. (2013). The
authors find evidence for a credit supply driven mortgage lending boom,
where lenders expanded their supply of mortgage lending and relaxed
their lending standards in the run-up to the subprime crisis of 2007–2009.
The shift in supply was tightly connected to the expansion of mortgage
securitisation since the early 2000’s. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2012) ar-
gue that the relaxation of lending standards was partly explained by an
increase in credit demand, when controlling for supply-side factors such
as house prices and securitisation.
This paper is linked to a growing body of literature on the interactions of
house prices prices and aggregate consumption. Iacoviello (2005), Kiy-
otaki et al. (2011), Iacoviello and Pavan (2013), and Guerrieri and Ia-
coviello (2014) study aggregate housing debt and the interaction between
house prices and consumption. Kaplan and Violante (2014) and Gorea
and Midrigan (2015) look at the aggregate implications of wealth and liq-
uidity heterogeneity and the marginal propensity of constrained agents
to consume out of housing wealth. Favilukis et al. (2017) explore how a
relaxation of financial constraints can lead to a house price boom. How-
ever, these papers do not explain or motivate why some borrowers are
constrained. In contrast to these papers, my focus is on formulating ex-
plicitly the incentives for entry to the credit market as well as default
incentives. Under private types, a credit constraint on households arises
endogenously as the least-creditworthy borrowers self-select out of the
credit market given the equilibrium terms on borrowing.
This research also connects to recent quantitative models of the housing
market where mortgage borrowers can strategically default, such as Cor-
bae and Quintin (2015), Guler (2015), Arslan et al. (2015), and Elenev et al.
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(2016). These papers are more quantitative in nature than this paper, but
their results are similar to mine: households have the strongest incentives
to default when they both face an adverse income shock and their home
equity is negative. However, unlike this paper, they do not consider pri-
vate information, with the exception of Guler (2015).
The paper also contributes to the study of risk-averse agents and adverse
selection in macroeconomic literature. A recent strand of literature has
attempted to explain inefficiencies in aggregate investment by exploiting
an adverse selection framework. Eisfeldt (2004), House (2006), Morris and
Shin (2012), Takalo and Toivanen (2012), Jokivuolle et al. (2014) and Bi-
gio (2015) look at investment in entrepreneurial projects, or the financing
of capital production, in general equilibrium when the financing is af-
fected by asymmetric information on project quality. On the supply side,
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) find that increasing asymmetric informa-
tion across lenders can lead to a tightening of lending standards, as lenders
screen loan applicants better.
The model presented in this paper applies the adverse selection framework
of De Meza and Webb (1987, 1990), and builds upon the general equi-
librium framework of House (2006), although he focuses on risk-neutral
entrepreneurs who invest in capital investment projects. Guler (2015) stud-
ies an economy with adverse selection and strategic default in the housing
market, but contrary to this paper, argues that adverse selection has lead
to credit rationing rather than over-lending in the housing market, and
that the run-up to the subprime crisis can be explained with an increase
in information symmetry and thus an increase in efficiency of credit inter-
mediation, rather than an exacerbation of a market failure.
Finally, this paper connects to an old literature in macroeconomics and
macro-finance that focuses on deterministic and endogenous cycles in
investment. Examples include Azariadis and Smith (1998), Matsuyama
(2007); Matsuyama et al. (2016), Favara (2012), Beaudry et al. (2015), and
Azariadis et al. (2016). They all rely on some combination of demand
complementarities and costs of default to generate an endogenous cycle.
I am not aware of a paper that would apply these ideas to investment in
housing.
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes
the model economy. Section 3 solves for the credit market equilibrium
under symmetric and asymmetric information. Section 4 describes the
timing of events and characterises the equilibrium of the aggregate econ-
omy. Section 5 explores the link between house prices, interest rates, and
the selection into the housing market through a comparative statics exer-
cise. Section 6 extends the baseline model to accommodate an endogenous
boom-bust cycle in house prices, and discusses the implications of such a
cycle. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
In this section, I describe in detail the economic environment of the model.
First, I describe the stochastic structure of the economy and the informa-
tion sets of each agent. Then, I formulate the problems of each type of
agent.
2.1 Description of the economy
The economy consists of three types of agents: consumers, lenders, and
real estate agents. The consumers have a finite lifetime, and they consume
housing services and other consumption goods and receive an endowment
income. The lenders extend loans to consumers in a perfectly competitive
credit market. The real estate agents buy housing from exiting consumers
as well as from lenders who acquire foreclosed housing, refurbish them,
and re-sell them to newborn consumers.
There is a continuum of mass one of households which consist of con-
sumers who are risk averse. Each consumer only lives for two periods.
Each period, a new generation of consumers enters as the previous one
exits, so that the total mass of consumers stays constant. Each consumer
receives an exogenous income in both periods of her life. In the first pe-
riod, she must make a tenure choice of either buying or renting a unit of
housing. In order to buy a house, she needs a loan from a banker. In
the second period, she consumes housing services and other consumption
8
q1 \ y1 yH yL
qH piφ (1− pi)φ
qL pi(1− φ) (1− pi)(1− φ)
Table 1: Joint distribution of endowment y1 and house value q1 in t = 1
goods. I assume that debt is not perfectly enforceable, so that the borrower
can default on the loan in the second period instead of repayment.
Consider a consumer who lives for two periods, t = 0, 1. A consumer
who wishes to become a home-owner buys housing h in t = 0 at a unit
price q0. At the time of the purchase, the value of the house in t = 1 (q1) is
uncertain. It can be q1 = qH with probability φ, or q1 = qL with probability
1− φ, with qH > q0 > qL ≥ 0.
Similarly, the endowment of the consumer in period t = 1 is y1 ∈ {yH, yL}
with yH > y0 > yL > 0. The probability of receiving yH and yL are pi and
1− pi, respectively. The combination of these two sources of uncertainty
may trigger a default by homeowners. The joint distribution of y1 and q1
is shown in Table 1.
The consumers differ by their probability of realising a high endowment
yH: there is a continuum of types pi ∈ [0, 1]. This means that different
borrowers face a different risk of low income yL, and thus, a higher risk of
potential default. The consumers only differ in the probability pi they face;
otherwise, they have the same preferences, and the same support for the
income distribution y1 ∈ {yH, yL}, and the same stochastic process and
support for the housing value shock on q1.
The type pi is private information observed only by the consumer herself,
and not by other agents in the economy. Lenders and real estate agents
know the distribution of pi, F(pi), which is time-invariant.
There is also a continuum of mass one of lenders, who are risk neutral.
They have access to an infinitely elastic supply of funds (for example,
through the international financial market). The lenders grant loans to
borrowers, collect loan repayments, and consume their profits. The credit
market is perfectly competitive and anonymous, and the loans are one-
period loans.
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Finally, there is a continuum of mass one of real estate agents, who are
risk neutral. They buy the housing stock from each exiting generation of
households, as well as used housing held by lenders, refurbish it at no
cost, and sell or rent it to the entering generation.
2.2 The credit market
There is a competitive credit market where households can apply for loans
from a continuum of atomistic lenders. The loan contract consists of a
loan l0 and a repayment schedule given by min{(1+ r0)l0, q1h + ξy1}. The
lender observes the realisation of the house value q1 and the income y1
after the contract has been agreed upon, but before the loan repayment is
scheduled to be made. In the event of default, the lender seizes the house
and also has recourse to a fraction 0 < ξ < 1 of the borrower’s income, y1.
If there is no default, the lender collects the loan repayment (1+ r0)l0.
The credit market equilibrium is described in Section 3.
2.3 The household problem
Assume that there is a fixed aggregate stock of housing h¯. Each individ-
ual must occupy a housing unit of equal size h, which provides a flow of
housing services; each unit is ex-ante identical. Since income y0 is equal
across households as well, the assumption of fixed h means that, impor-
tantly, the ratio of housing to income hy0 — or equivalently leverage — is
constant across borrowers.3 The individual problem is to make the tenure
choice over owning or renting a house. Given this choice, the consumption
pattern in the second period is determined. I abstract from the choice over
how much housing to acquire.
Consider a generation of individuals born in period t = 0. Both a home-
owner and a tenant receive an exogenous income yt in both periods. If
the individual chooses to rent, she can earn the safe market rate r¯ on her
3The strict assumptions of identical y0 and h are made for convenience, but it is the
equal leverage ratio that is crucial. This assumption is important in equilibrium, because it
prevents borrowers from signaling their types to lenders by choosing different house sizes.
The implications of this assumption is discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.1.
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savings a0, while paying a rent st per unit of housing in the second period.
In contrast, a home-owner in the first period takes out a loan l0 to acquire
housing h at a unit price q0.
In the first period, there is no consumption; the endowment received in t =
0 is invested either into housing or a safe deposit. The budget constraint
of a homeowner and a tenant are then:
Home-owner q0h = y0 + l0
Tenant a0 = y0
At the beginning of the second period, the income y1 is realised, and the
home-owner makes the decision of whether or not to default. If there is
no default, she consumes and pays back the loan principal and interest.
However, if she chooses to default on the loan, the lender seizes the house
and the fraction ξy1 of the income, and the borrower must convert into
a tenant, paying rent s1 on housing. A defaulting borrower also faces a
deadweight loss cost of default κ ≥ 0. It can be interpreted as capturing
various real costs associated with default, such as legal costs or loss of
access to credit markets.
If the individual chooses to rent a house, she pays a unit rent s1 in t = 1,
and can save or borrow a0 in period 0 with the market interest rate r¯. In
the second period, she consumes her endowment and her savings.
The price of the consumption good acts as numeraire and is normalised
to unity.
The ex-post budget constraints of the household in the second period of
their life, t = 1, are:
Home-owner
No default c1 + (1+ r0)l0 = y1 + q1h
Default c1 + s1h = (1− ξ)y1 − κ
Tenant c1 + s1h = y1 + (1+ r¯)a0
The consumer derives utility from consuming housing services and other
goods in the second period of her life, captured by the utility function
u(c) + χiv(h), where i = h, r designates a home-owner (h) or tenant (r).
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The utility function is separable in housing services and other goods, and
I assume u(·) increasing and concave: u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0. Utility from
housing services satisfies v(·) > 0 and v(0) = 0. In addition, home-
owners enjoy a utility premium on housing services: χh is normalised to
1 for i = h, and χr = χ < 1 for tenants.4
The value function of a consumer of type pi in t0 who becomes a home-
owner is:
VH(pi) = E[u(c1(y1, q1)) + v(h)|pi]
= p(pi)E[u(cnd(y1, q1)) + v(h)|pi] + (1− p(pi))E[u(cd(y1)) + χv(h)|pi]
(1)
s.t. q0h = y0 + l0 (2)
cnd(y1, q1) = y1 + q1h− (1+ r0)l0 (3)
cd(y1) = (1− ξ)y1 − κ − s1h (4)
where cnd denotes period 1 consumption in case of no default, and cd
period 1 consumption in case of default. Both are functions of the period
1 income y1. The consumption under no default also depends on the house
value q1.
p(pi) is the individual ex-ante probability of not defaulting in t = 1, given
the home-owner’s type pi. It is an equilibrium object, for which the ex-
pression is derived in Section 3.1.
Substituting the period 0 budget constraint (2) into the no-default budget
constraint (3) and rearranging yields the intertemporal budget constraint
cnd(y1, q1) = y1 + (1+ r)y0 + ∆qh− r0q0h (5)
where ∆q ≡ q1 − q0 equals the capital gain on the house. The term r0q0 is
the user cost of housing borne in the second period.
4Since the housing choice is a binary one (own/rent), the separability assumption is
not crucial, but it is analytically convenient. For the same reason, the shape of v is not
important as long as an owner enjoys a utility premium relative to a tenant.
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The value function of a consumer who becomes a tenant is:
VR(pi) = E[u(cr(y1)) + χv(h)|pi] (6)
= piu(cr(yH)) + (1− pi)u(cr(yL)) + χv(h) (7)
s.t. cr(y1) = y1 + (1+ r¯)y0 − s1h (8)
An individual chooses to buy a house and become a home-owner if and
only if VH(pi) ≥ VR(pi). The trade-off that the individual faces is the
higher income in the good state, in the form of the risky capital gain on
housing, as well as enjoying the utility premium on housing services, as a
home-owner, versus the less risky consumption granted by the safe return
on savings as a tenant.
The value function of a household of type pi in the first period is thus:
V(pi) = max{VH(pi), VR(pi)}. (9)
2.4 The real estate market
There is also a competitive real estate market, where a continuum of atom-
istic real estate agents act. In each period, a representative real estate agent
buys housing both from successful exiting home-owners in the second pe-
riod of their lifetime, and from lenders who have seized the houses of
defaulting home-owners. The real estate agents refurbishes the housing
stock at no cost, and sells it to the new, entering generation.
I assume that the whole housing stock, both owner-occupied and rental
housing, are subject to the same distribution of value shocks. Then, in any
given period, a fraction φ ends up as high value (qH), and a fraction 1− φ
is low value (qL).
Competition drives the profits of the real estate agents to zero, so that the
sales price of the refurbished housing to a generation entering in period t
is:
qt = φqH + (1− φ)qL. (10)
The real estate agents also rent part of the housing stock to the defaulting
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homeowners whose houses have been foreclosed, and households who
have chosen to rent, in any given period t at a rental rate of st, and bear
the user cost rt−1qt−1 per unit of housing. Perfect competition then drives
the rental rate down to equal the user cost of housing:
st = rt−1qt−1. (11)
3 Credit market equilibrium
The credit market intermediates funds to consumers who wish to become
homeowners but who cannot self-finance their housing investment. Un-
der the assumptions made in Section 2, all consumers receive an identical
endowment in the first period of their life, so that all (or none) of those
who wish to buy a house must borrow.
In this section, I characterise the credit market equilibrium by focusing on
a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept. I derive the optimal default deci-
sion of the borrower, given the loan amount and repayment, and the terms
of the loan contract offered by the lender, given the ex-ante expectation of
default in the borrower pool. The equilibrium in the loan market in the
first period of a given generation is then characterised by the terms of the
credit contract and a set of borrowers who accept this contract, given the
ex-ante default probabilities. I analyse the equilibrium both under sym-
metric and asymmetric information in order to highlight the externality
that causes over-investment.
3.1 Optimal default decision
In the second period, a home-owner will choose not to default if and only
if:
u(cnd(y1, q1)) + v(h) ≥ u(cd(y1)) + χv(h) (12)
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for a given realisation (y1, q1). Then, the ex-ante probability of no default,
conditional on the borrower type pi, is:
Pr{’no default’ |pi} =Pr{u(cnd(y1, q1)) + v(h) ≥ u(cd(y1)) + χv(h) |pi}
(13)
≡p(pi).
This is equivalent to:
Pr{’no default’ |pi} = Pr{(1− χ)v(h) ≥ u(cd(y1))− u(cnd(y1, q1)) |pi}.
(14)
In other words, the homeowner will not default if the utility premium
from owner-occupied housing relative to tenant-occupied housing is greater
than the utility in terms of consumption insurance acquired by defaulting.
Because utility is increasing in consumption, but more so in the no-default
state (because only a fraction 1− ξ can be consumed in the default state),
the right hand side of this inequality is decreasing in y1. Thus the proba-
bility of no default, p(pi), is increasing with the likelihood of high income,
pi.
Correspondingly, the conditional default probability is 1− p(pi), which is
decreasing in pi.
3.2 Credit market equilibrium under symmetric information
Assume that there is symmetric information about borrower types, so that
a lender can observe each individual borrower’s type pi, and subsequently,
also their individual ex-ante default probability p(pi). Then, he will offer
a different loan contract Cpi characterised by an interest rate r(pi) to each
type pi. The symmetric information equilibrium thus provides the first-
best benchmark for the credit market, since each consumer faces individ-
ual loan terms that reflect their true riskiness, or type pi.
Each potential borrower will demand a loan of equal size: l0 = q0h− y0.
Then the interest rate offered to each potential borrower fully characterises
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a contract Cpi. The expected return on such a loan is
EΠ(pi) = p(pi)(1+ r(pi))l0 + (1− p(pi))E[q1h + ξy1 | ’default’,pi], (15)
where in case of no default, the lender receives the repayment of the loan
amount and interest, and in case of default, recovers the house and the
fraction ξ of income of the borrower.
Perfect competition ensures that the expected return on each individual
loan is equal to the opportunity cost of the funds, 1+ r¯:
p(pi)[1+ r(pi)]l0 + (1− p(pi))E[q1h + ξy1 | ’default’,pi] = (1+ r¯)l0
⇔ 1+ r(pi) = 1+ r¯
p(pi)
− 1− p(pi)
p(pi)
E[q1h + ξy1 | ’default’,pi]
l0
. (16)
The term E[q1h + ξy1 | ’default’,pi] gives the lender’s expected compensa-
tion in case of default, given that default occurs and the borrower’s type
is pi. Because borrowers choose when to default strategically, the state
(y1, q1) under which default occurs, and thus also the lender’s return in
the default state, is endogenous and depends on the type. The no-default
probability is increasing in the probability of a favourable income realisa-
tion, pi. This implies that the individual rate 1 + r(pi) is decreasing in pi:
dr(pi)
dpi < 0.
Given the offered rate r(pi), a borrower accepts the loan and becomes a
homeowner if VH(pi) ≥ VR(pi), as given by equations (1) and (6); other-
wise, she becomes a tenant. High pi borrowers enjoy lower interest rates
on their loans. At the limit, the borrower with pi = 1 faces no income risk,
but only a risk of the house losing its value.
Denote by the superscript FB (for “first-best”) variables under the sym-
metric information equilibrium. Given the rate r(pi) and using the budget
constraints (4) and (5), the first-best consumption of a type-pi homeowner
in the no-default (nd) and default (d) states, respectively, are:
cFBnd (y1, q1;pi) = (1+ r(pi))y0 + y1 + ∆qh− r(pi)q0h (17)
cFBd (y1;pi) = (1− ξ)y1 − κ − s1h, (18)
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and the consumption of a tenant is:
cFBr (y1;pi) = y1 + (1+ r¯)y0 − s1h. (19)
Proposition 1 The credit market equilibrium under symmetric information is
characterised by a set of contracts Cpi = {l0, min{(1+ r(pi))l0, q1h+ ξy1}} and
a cut-off type pˆiFB ∈ [0, 1] such that all individuals with pi ≥ pˆiFB accept Cpi and
become home-owners, and all individuals with pi < pˆiFB become tenants, and the
lenders break even in expectation for every type pi individually.
Proof In Appendix A.1.
The first-best, or efficient, cutoff type pˆiFB is just indifferent between buy-
ing and renting, and is characterised by:
VFBH (pˆi
FB) = VFBR (pˆi
FB)
⇔ E[p(pˆiFB)[u(cFBnd (pˆiFB)) + v(h)] + (1− p(pˆiFB))[u(cFBd ) + χv(h)] | pˆiFB] =
E[u(cr) + χv(h) | pˆiFB]
⇔ p(pˆiFB) = E[u(c
FB
r )− u(cFBd ) | pˆiFB]
E[u(cFBnd (pˆi
FB))− u(cFBd ) + (1− χ)v(h) | pˆiFB]
. (20)
The credit market equilibrium under symmetric information is efficient
and establishes a first-best benchmark. It is efficient because the cost of
borrowing of each type correctly reflects their true default risk. The impli-
cations of this feature are further discussed in Section 5.
3.3 Credit market equilibrium under asymmetric information
Now return to the assumption that a borrower’s type is unobservable to
the lender. I focus on a particular perfect Bayesian equilibrium charac-
terised by pooling of borrowers.
Again, all borrowers demand a loan of equal size, l0 = q0h− y0. However,
now-pi borrowers have the incentive to mimic high-pi borrowers in order to
get a loan with favorable terms because of the limited liability in case of de-
fault. There exists now an equilibrium, characterised by a cut-off, in which
the banker lends to all borrowers above the cut-off, and charges an com-
mon interest rate r0 from all borrowers, such that he makes a non-negative
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expected profit in expectation on the pool of loans. The equilibrium is
characterised by a pooling contract C = {l0, min{(1+ r0)l0, q1h + ξy1}}.
The equilibrium interest rate is determined by the break-even condition of
the lenders. The expected return of a banker who charges an interest rate
r0, given the pool of loan applicants characterised by the cutoff pˆi, is given
by:
EΠ(r0) = E[p(pi)|pi ≥ pˆi](1+ r0)l0 + E[(1− p(pi))(q1h + ξy1)|pi ≥ pˆi].
(21)
In equilibrium, the competition drives the return on the loan down to
equal the market rate, or the opportunity cost of the funds. The equilib-
rium interest rate offered to all loan applicants, r∗, is then given by:
EΠ(r0) = (1+ r¯)l0
⇔ 1+ r0 = 1+ r¯E[p(pi)|pi ≥ pˆi] −
E[(1− p(pi))(q1h + ξy1)|pi ≥ pˆi]
E[p(pi)|pi ≥ pˆi]l0 ≡ 1+ r
∗.
(22)
Given the offered rate r0 = r∗, an individual accepts the contract C if
VH(pi, r∗) ≥ VR(pi). The cutoff type pˆi is implicitly determined by:
VH(pˆi, r∗) = VR(pˆi)
⇔ p(pˆi) = E[u(cr(y1))− u(cd(y1))|pˆi]
E[u(cnd(y1, q1, r∗))− u(cd(y1)) + (1− χ)v(h)|pˆi] , (23)
where cnd, cd and cr are given by equations (5), (4) and (8), respectively.
Proposition 2 The credit market equilibrium under asymmetric information is
characterised by a pooling contract C = {l0, r∗} and a cut-off type pˆi ∈ [0, 1]
such that all individuals with pi ≥ pˆi accept C and become home-owners, and all
individuals with pi < pˆi become tenants, and the lenders break even in expectation
on the whole pool of loans given pˆi.
Proof In Appendix A.1.
18
3.3.1 Discussion on the nature of the credit market equilibrium
The pooling equilibrium described in this section rests on very strict as-
sumptions. Three assumptions, in particular, are crucial: first, the fixed
size of housing; second, the absence of consumption in the first period;
and third, perfect competition in the credit market. The first two assump-
tions prevent any signaling by borrowers in the first period on their private
types. The third one places a bound on the interest rates that a lender can
offer. The assumption of equal initial endowments, on the other hand,
could be relaxed to allow for idiosyncratic income also in the first period,
as long as this income is not correlated with type (as in the second pe-
riod). Because of these assumptions, lenders cannot infer anything about
the loan applicants’ types when offering the loan contracts, and pooling
arises in equilibrium.
The pooling equilibrium also crucially depends on the set of available loan
instruments and the incompleteness of markets. Here, I have assumed that
only standard debt contracts are available.5 Then, under the assumptions
above, no signaling by applying for loans for houses of different size or
entailing different down payments is possible. But other types of contracts
could allow for the separation of types in equilibrium.
The possibility of default offers partial consumption insurance if the in-
dividual is faced with adverse shocks, i.e. some state contingency. The
absence of complete markets makes the loan contract lucrative for the
subprime types. If lenders were allowed to offer state-contingent debt
contracts, with higher interest rates but lower repayment ratios in case of
adverse shocks, some types with a high income risk would find it optimal
to self-select into these contracts.
Another possibility would be to allow for unsecured debt contracts. Then,
a lender could offer contracts with a higher interest rate but no collateral
alongside the collateralised debt contract. Again, this would offer better
insurance for the lower types and could result in a separating equilibrium.
5De Meza and Webb (1999) argue that the standard debt contract can be optimal under
certain conditions in a model of private types. In particular, assume that only the debt
repayment is verifiable, and not the wealth of the borrower, when the debt is redeemed.
However, in case of default, assume that also the borrower’s wealth can be verified at no
cost. Under such circumstances the standard debt contract is the optimal contract.
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Last, as noted for example by Tirole (2006, Ch. 6.5), it could be optimal for
a lender to just pay the worst types to stay out of the market.
However, none of these features — state-contingent debt contracts, unse-
cured debt, or lenders offering to pay applicants in order not to apply —
are observed in actual credit markets for housing finance. I have chosen
to make very strict assumptions in order to sustain a pooling equilibrium,
because it offers a natural way to define overborrowing and subprime bor-
rowers in a theoretical context.6
Finally, the assumption of perfectly competitive credit markets is crucial in
sustaining the pooling equilibrium. Competition drives down the interest
rate in such a way that no lender is able to deviate from the equilibrium by
offering contracts with higher interest rates in an attempt to screen loan
applicants. It is in essence the combination of private types and perfect
competition that drives selection of subprime types in the market and
creates the over-investment externality.
4 Equilibrium and model solution
4.1 Timing
The timing of the model is as follows. In every period t, a new generation
enters. A generation indexed by its entry period t = τ. Each generation
lives for two periods, t and t + 1. The timing within the two periods of a
generation entering in t = 0 is outlined in Table 2.
4.2 Equilibrium and aggregation
The equilibrium is an allocation {cτt+1, pˆit, ht, r∗t , qt, st}∞t=0 is such that given
the interest rate r∗t , the cut-off pˆit satisfies (23) and the household consump-
tion plan is given by cτt+1 = {cnd, cd, cr}, defined by equations (5), (4) and
(8); the loan interest rate r∗t satisfies (22) given pˆit; the house sales price qt
6I make no claim that the actual housing market in the U.S. during the housing boom
would have been characterised by perfect pooling; however, some partial pooling of appli-
cants seems likely to have been present.
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Period 0
• The generation τ = 0 is born and receives the first-period endow-
ment y0.
• The preceding generation τ = −1 sells their housing stock to the
real estate agents, consume, and exit.
• The new generation observes the house price q0 and the income y0,
and make its housing choice. The cutoff type pˆi0 is determined.
Period 1
• The house values q1 ∈ qH, qL as well as the income realisations
y1 ∈ yH, yL are realised and observed by all agents.
• The homeowners make their optimal default choice.
• The successful homeowners sell their housing to the real estate
agents at the price q1 and consume cnd(y1, q1).
• The renters consume cr(y1) and the foreclosed homeowners con-
sume cd(y1).
• The generation τ = 0 exits while a new one enters.
Table 2: Timing of events
satisfies (10); the rental rate st satisfies (11); and the following conditions
hold:
Yτ = Cτ + Hτ (24)
h¯ =
∫ 1
0
h dpi, (25)
where equation (24) is the aggregate consistency condition, and (25) is
the housing market clearing condition; h¯ denotes the aggregate housing
stock, which is fixed. Cτ is the aggregate consumption of goods, Hτ is
the aggregate consumption of housing services, and Yτ is the aggregate
income of generation τ, born in period τ = t. They are defined as:
Cτ =
∫ 1
0
cτt+1 dpi (26)
Hτ =
∫ 1
0
sτt+1 dpi (27)
Yτ =
∫ pˆiτ
0
[(1+ r¯)yt + yt+1]dpi + (1− γτ)
∫ 1
pˆiτ
(yt+1 − κ)dpi
+ γτ
∫ 1
pˆiτ
[(1+ r)yt + yt+1 + ∆qt+1]dpi (28)
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where pˆiτ denotes the cutoff type in generation τ, and γτ the ex-post frac-
tion of non-defaulting home-owners in generation τ in the second period
of their life. By the law of large numbers, γτ → E[p(pi)|pi ≥ pˆi].
4.3 Functional forms
I assume log utility u(·) = v(·) = log(·) and a uniform distribution of
types with pi ∼ Uni f orm(0, 1). Under the latter assumption, f (pi) = 1
and F(pi) = pi denote the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of pi, respectively. These
simple functional forms allow for an analytical solution of the equilibrium
default probability and the equilibrium interest rate as well as a simple
characterisation of the cut-off type.
In particular, the optimal default choice (12) is given by the condition:
u(cd(y1)) + χv(h) > u(cnd(y1, q1)) + v(h)
⇔ log(cd(y1)) + χ log(h) > log(cnd(y1, q1)) + log(h)
By substituting in the budget constraints (4) and (3), this condition can be
solved for:
y1 +Φq1h < Φ
(
(1+ r∗)l0 − κh1−χ
)
where Φ ≡
(
1− 1−ξh1−χ
)−1
> 0.
Therefore, the ex-ante optimal default probability of a type pi is given by
Pr{’default’ |pi} = Pr
{
y1 +Φq1h < Φ
(
(1+ r∗)l0 − κh
)
|pi
}
≡ 1− p(pi).
Then, the borrower optimally defaults if and only if the weighted sum of
y1 and q1 realises a low enough value. In other words, default is optimal
in the joint event of both y1 and q1 realising a low enough value. In the
calibration I use, optimal default occurs only when y1 = yL and q1 = qL,
i.e. when the home-owner suffers both an adverse income and an adverse
house value shock at the same time. In other states of the world, the
borrower has no incentive to default.
In this case, the default probability of a type pi is 1− p(pi) = (1− φ)(1−
pi), which is the joint probablity of the event (y1, q1) = (yL, qL).
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Then the ex-ante default probability of a borrower from a lender’s point
of view, given the borrower cut-off type, is:
E[(1− φ)(1− pi)|pi ≥ pˆi] = 1− φ− (1− φ)E[pi|pi ≥ pˆi]
= 1− φ− (1− φ)
∫ 1
pˆi pi f (pi)dpi
1− F(pˆi)
=
1
2
(1− φ)(1− pˆi).
and correspondinly the no-default probability is E[1− (1− φ)(1−pi)|pi ≥
pˆi] = 12 (1 + φ + (1− φ)pˆi). Finally, the equilibrium pooling interest rate
(22) in this case is:
1+ r∗ =
1+ r¯
1
2 (1+ φ+ (1− φ)pˆi)
− 1− φ− (1− φ)pˆi
1+ φ+ (1− φ)pˆi
qLh + ξyL
l0
. (29)
4.4 Numerical calibration and solution
The parameter values used in the numerical model solution and simula-
tion are given in Table 3. They are chosen to mach some key housing
market statistics from the U.S. data. The data moments are based on the
figures given in Corbae and Quintin (2015) and on the author’s own cal-
culations based on the Case-Shiller index and the Survey of Consumer
Finances.
Table 4 shows some statistics from the U.S. data and the corresponding
statistics generated by the model under the calibration given in Table 3.
The data are annual and include data series on house prices, the home-
ownership rate, the mortgage delinquency rate and real income. The
changes in house prices in the data are computed as the ratio of the Case-
Shiller national house prices index to its trend in 2006 (the peak-to-trend
ratio) and in 2012 (the trough-to-trend) ratio in the sample 1991–2015. The
homeownership rate is the U.S. average over the sample period 1991–2015.
The delinquency rate is the average delinquency rate on all single-family
residential mortgages over the same sample period. Real personal income
growth is measured as the overall growth over 1975–2015. The model
matches all of these long-run averages quite well.
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Parameter Value
Safe interest rate R¯ 1.04
Utility from owner-occ. h vH(h) 0.2
Lender appropriation rate ξ 0.288
High house value prob. φ 0.915
Default DWL cost κ 2.08
q0/y0 2.94
qH/q0 1.07
qL/q0 0.24
yH/y0 1.43
yL/y0 0.71
Table 3: Baseline parameter calibration
According to Ospina and Uhlig (2016), the average loan-to-value ratio at
origination over 2006–2012 was 0.7. Hayre and Saraf (2008) estimate that
losses in the event of default range from 35% to 60%. I choose parame-
ter values that produce a recovery rate of 0.48, which is well in the range
of these estimates and also consistent with the value used in Corbae and
Quintin (2015). Also in line with the results in Corbae and Quintin (2015),
I choose parameters such that default is optimal only when hit by both ad-
verse shocks. Finally, based on figures reported in Kawano and LaLumia
(2015), annual income loss at unemployment is at around 76% in the data.
I choose the income parameters to roughly replicate this figure.
The spread between 30-year fixed rate mortgages and the 30-year T-bond
has been on average 162bp over the sample 1977–2002, before the financial
crisis and the boom. The model is consistent with this figure. Household
indebtedness, measured as the ratio of total household debt to disposable
income, was around 130% at the peak of the boom in 2006. The model
produces a ratio somewhat higher than this peak observed in the data.
Finally, data on household consumption expenditures shows a share of
around 40% going towards rents, whereas the model produces a some-
what lower figure.
In order to study the behaviour of the model, I solve for the equilibrium
numerically using iteration methods. The numerical solution algorithm is
described in Appendix A.2. Taken together, the figures in Tables 3 and 4
show that the model, while simple, can replicate some of the long-run av-
erages in the U.S. housing market data. In the next section, I look at some
comparative statistics to gauge further how the selection into homeown-
ership depends especially on the safe interest rate r¯ and on the housing
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Variable Data Model
Safe interest rate 1.04 1.04
Homeownership rate 0.66 0.66
Average recovery rate 0.5 0.48
Delinquency rate 0.023 0.028
Loan-to-value ratio 0.7 0.66
House prices peak-to-trend 1.33 1.07
House prices trough-to-trend 0.83 0.24
Real personal inc. 1975-2015 1.33 1.43
Income loss at unempl. 0.76 0.71
Loan spread 162 bp 162 bp
Household indebtedness ratio 1.30 1.94
Rent-to-income ratio 0.38 0.20
Default only when (yL, qL) X X
Table 4: Data moments and model counterparts
value risk φ.
5 Equilibrium characteristics
In this section, I describe some equilibrium features of the model: over-
investment in housing, the source of this inefficiency, and the links be-
tween default rates, house prices, and interest rates.
5.1 The over-investment externality and subprime borrowing
The key feature of models of the credit market with a De Meza and Webb
(1987) type of information structure, such as here, is that the equilibrium
in the credit market equilibrium is inefficient in the sense that there is
over-investment compared to the first best whenever there is a non-zero
possibility of borrower default.
The marginal type pˆi is the riskiest type in the loan pool, meaning that the
loan pool is riskier than it would be under symmetric information. Equiv-
alently, as the pooling interest rate r∗ is decreasing in pˆi, this implies that
pˆi ≤ pˆiFB for all pˆi. The set of borrowers of borrowers that are able to get
a loan under asymmetric information, but would not do so under sym-
metric information can be called subprime borrowers. They are borrowers
whose loans are not socially optimal. In particular, under the assumption
of uniform distribution of types, this set is equal to the share pˆiFB − pˆi.
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Figure 2: Value functions under symmetric and asymmetric information
Similarly, under uniformly distributed types, the homeownership rate is
defined as 1− pˆi.
This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the value functions of a tenant
VR(pi) and a home-owner VH(pi) as a function of type pi, together with
their respective first-best counterparts. All value functions are increasing
in the type: a high type has, on expectation, a higher consumption in the
second period because of the lower income risk.
Two notable features of the equilibrium are shown in the figure. First,
there is a discontinuity in the homeowner’s value function under sym-
metric information, VFBH (pi). This is because the lowest types, left of the
jump, default whenever they face the low house value shock q1 = qL, re-
gardless of their income y1. This high default probability is reflected in
a very high interest rate offered to them, which makes borrowing very
expensive for them.
This discontinuity is absent in the corresponding value function under
asymmetric information, VH(pi). This reflects the externality associated
with entry into the credit market. If an agent of type pi enters the market
and takes a loan, it yields her an expected marginal utility of consumption
26
u′(cnd) with probability of p(pi), i.e. if she does not default. This expecta-
tion is the higher, the higher the type. The cost of entry, however, does not
depend on type: the pooling interest rate 1+ r∗ is the same for all entrants.
The asymmetric information case is parametrised here in such a way that
default is only optimal when (y1, q1) = (yL, qL).
However, by entering the market, the marginal borrower makes the pool
marginally riskier, and thus increases the interest rate faced by all other
agents in the credit market as well. It is this change in the interest rate
r∗ induced by entry, which affects the consumption available in the no-
default state for every borrower, that the marginal borrower does not inter-
nalise under asymmetric information. In the symmetric case, the interest
rate 1+ r(pi) correctly reflects each type’s riskiness, so that the externality
disappears.
The second important feature is that the value functions VH(pi) and VFBH (pi)
cross exactly at the efficient cut-off pˆiFB. This reflects the cross-subsidisation
induced by credit market pooling. All types pi > pˆiFB would better off
under symmetric information, because they would face cheaper interest
rates than the pooling rate. Conversely, all types pˆiFB ≥ pi ≥ pˆi are better
off under asymmetric information: they are being subsidised by the types
pi > pˆiFB and enjoy a lower interest rate than they would under symmetric
information. They are also types that would not enter the credit market
under symmetric information.
The implications of an increase in credit supply, i.e. a decrease in the
cut-off pˆi, on aggregate consumption are more subtle. There are two ef-
fects that move in different directions. As more households gain access
to the credit market and can consume capital gains on their housing, ag-
gregate consumption increases. But as the borrower pool expands, it also
becomes riskier, so the interest rate on loans rises. This increases the user
cost of housing, which includes the interest payments on the loan. This
mechanically increases the value of consumption of housing services, but
reduces resources left for the consumption of goods other than housing
services. The aggregate effect depends on which component dominates,
but for plausible parameter values, it is positive when house prices are in-
creasing. Conversely, when house prices decline, capital gains are eroded,
which contracts aggregate consumption.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium cut-off types and default probability of the borrower
pool as a function of the house price risk φ
5.2 Comparative statics
To gauge how the the overborrowing externality depends on the various
parameters of the model, I perform a comparative statistics where I change
three key parameters of the model one-by-one, all the while keeping all
other parameters fixed. The parameters of interest are the probability of a
high house value realisation φ, the safe interest rate 1 + r¯, and the lender
appropriation rate ξ.
The extent of the externality is quantified in Figures 3 and 4, and 4. They
show how the marginal type pˆi, the ex-ante default probability of default
in the borrower pool observed by the lender, E[1− p(pi)|pi ≥ pˆi], and the
equilibrium pooling loan interest rate r∗ (or the mean equilibrium inter-
est rate under symmetric information, defined as
∫ 1
pˆiFB r(pi)dpi) change as
three key parameters of the models change.
As Figure 3 shows, the model exhibits a non-linear relationship between
the probability of a high house value realisation φ and demand for owner-
occupied housing, i.e. the marginal type, all other parameter being fixed
at their benchmark values. Strikingly, the homeownership rate is 100 %
(i.e. the marginal type is 0) both when a high house value is very unlikely
and very likely.
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At the limit, when the high house value yH will never occur, i.e. when
φ = 0, the purchase price of the house is equal to the low value: q0 = qL.
Then, buying a house is very cheap, and there is no price risk involved.
As a consequence, owning is very attractive to all types, even those with
low expected income. Even as φ becomes positive, for low values, q0 =
φqH + (1− φ)qL remains low. Because loan amounts are low and home-
owners derive a utility bonus from owning rather than renting, default is
never optimal for any type pi when φ is low. The threshold under which
households are able to self-finance is marked in the left panel of Figure 3
by a vertical dashed line.
As φ increases, also the purchase price q0 and loan amounts increase. At
first, the worst types who have the lowest expected income start opting
out and renting instead. However, default remains non-optimal for all
types in the borrower pool. Eventually, as q0 keeps rising, default becomes
optimal for some types. There is a discontinuous jump of the ex-ante de-
fault probability of the borrower pool away from zero at around φ = 0.63.
At this point, as defaults become a non-zero probability event, the over-
investment externality kicks in and the asymmetric information equilib-
rium is no longer efficient: the efficient marginal type is higher than the
actual one under asymmetric information.
As the probality of the high house value and therefore the purchase price
q0 keep rising, the worst types keep opting out of the credit market, and
thus the borrower pool becomes safer. Although defaults still happen, the
pool becomes less risky.
However, as the high house value becomes likely enough, at around φ =
0.80, riskier types with worse income expectations are drawn back to the
credit market. Consequently, the ex-ante default rate sharply increases,
peaking at φ = 0.95.
The loan interest rates depend on the default probabilities and thus largely
follow the changes in default incentives. The mean loan interest rate under
symmetric information is higher than the pooling loan rate under asym-
metric information in certain regions. This reflects the fact that under
symmetric information, each type is charged a rate that reflects their true
ex-ante default probability.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium cut-off types and default probability of the borrower
pool as a function of the outside interest rate 1+ r¯
For very high values of φ in the range 0.95–0.99, homeowners actually
default whenever they are hit by a low house value also under asym-
metric information, regardless of their income realisation, because they
are so highly levered. Then the ex-ante default probability is no longer
dependent of the composition of the borrower pool. In this region, the
inefficiency thus disappears. This behaviour is ruled out in the bench-
mark calibration, where φ = 0.915. The kink in the default probability of
the borrower pool under symmetric information in the figure also reflects
these discontinuities in default incentives.
It is in this region of increasing market participation that the over-investment
inefficiency is at its worst. For a given value of φ, the vertical distance of
the two curves measures the extent of this inefficiency, or the amount of
subprime borrowing. Then this distance can also be interpreted to mea-
sure the looseness of lending standards relative to first-best: it shows that
lending standards are loose exactly when high house values are relatively
likely.
Figure 4 shows a similar exercise of comparative statics for the interest
rate 1+ r¯, all other parameter being fixed at their benchmark values. The
baseline value is 1+ r¯ = 1.044.
The marginal type is increasing in the safe interest rate. When r¯ is low,
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Figure 5: Equilibrium cut-off types and default probabilities of the bor-
rower pool as a function of the lender appropriation rate ξ
the cost of lending as well as the outside return for savings is low as
well. Therefore purchasing a house is very attractive. As the safe interest
rate increases, borrowing becomes more expensive and the outside return
better; this leads the worst types to opt out of the credit market. The in-
efficiency is worst at low values of r¯: since in the symmetric information
economy each agent’s cost of funding reflects their true riskiness as bor-
rowers through a type-dependent margin over the safe rate, it increases
faster for low types than when they face the pooling interest rate. These
marginal types then choose to opt out for lower values of r¯ than under
asymmetric information.
The average ex-ante default probability of the borrower pool is higher un-
der symmetric than asymmetric information when r¯ is very low (notably,
when r¯ < 1.01). This is because when borrowing is very cheap and thus
attractive, some households default whenever q1 = qL, regardless of their
income realisation y1. The lenders know this and charge appropriately
high interest rates to cover this higher default probability.
As the borrowing rates are pinned down by the safe interest rate r¯, they
increase as r¯ increases. Here, for a low safe interest rate level, the mean
loan rate under symmetric information is notable higher than the pooling
rate under asymmetric information. In this region, participation is also
very high. This suggests that the subsidisation of high-risk borrowers is
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particularly strong, which is reflected also in the large inefficiency region
in Panel (a) of the figure.
Finally, Figure 5 shows a comparative statics exercise with respect to the
lender appropriation rate ξ. The rest of the parameters are calibrated as
in the benchmark case summarised in Table 3. Recall that when ξ = 0,
the lender cannot seize any of the second-period income of the borrower
in case of default, and when ξ = 1, she can seize all of it, in addition to
the house. The baseline value is ξ = 0.288. For values below ξ = 0.25, no
equilibrium exists given the rest of the parameter values in the benchmark
calibration; thus only the range ξ ∈ [0.25, 1] is reported in the figure.
This exercise shows that stricter regulation in case of default – as ξ in-
creases – mitigates incentives for default. At around ξ = 0.45, no house-
holds wants to take out a loan and risk losing such a share of their income
in case of default. Consequently, also the default rate declines. But this
also mean that the default regulation is so strict that homeownership goes
down to zero. Such a regulation is a much too blunt tool to curb the over-
borrowing problem: it affects all borrowers equally. A policy that aims to
curb the overborrowing externality needs to address the borrowing incen-
tives directly.
5.2.1 Discussion
The characteristics of the equilibrium described in this section have some
poignant policy implications.
The comparative statistics exercises highlight that the over-investment ex-
ternality is particularly big first, when house values are relatively high on
expectation, which is reflected in high purchase prices; and second, when
interest rates are relatively low. These are exactly the type of conditions
that prevailed in the U.S. during the housing boom.
First, there is a direct link between the over-investment externality and
the conduct of monetary policy. A low interest rate regime directly fuels
households’ incentives to take on debt, which is not suprising. Notably,
the effective Federal Funds rate was very low, around 1%, in 2002–2003 at
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the height of the housing boom.7
Second, the cross-subsidisation of high-risk borrowers is at the heart of
the externality. In the U.S. and many other countries, promoting home-
ownership by supporting cheap and accessible mortgage borrowing has
been a political priority for decades. This has likely made borrowing too
cheap for many households.
Finally, during the housing boom years of the early 2000s, it was not un-
common for lenders to offer very low “teaser rates” for on new adjustable-
rate loans, further increasing the attractiveness of these loans in the eyes
of many households. When the interest rates on these loans increased af-
ter the teaser period, many borrowers found themselves unable to service
their debt. This suggests that they would not, or perhaps should not, have
borrowed on terms that truly reflected their credit risk.
These observations demonstrate that there are very important links be-
tween monetary policy and financial stability stemming from the links
between interest rates and the incentives for borrowing and defaulting
among borrowers.
6 An endogenous boom-bust cycle
So far, the model I have presented is essentially static in nature. Because
there is no aggregate uncertainty, the expected value of housing is the
same for each entering generation, and there are no aggregate cycles. The
problem of each generation is identical to any other.
In this section, I extend the model to allow for an endogenous boom-bust
cycle in house prices. Two additional ingredients are needed. The first
one is an aggregate demand complementarity in housing: the households
must derive more utility from owning a house when many others own a
house as well. This element captures the “boom” in the house price cycle:
it can be interpreted as a sort of hype surrounding homeownership that
induces more households to enter the housing market.
7See e.g. the data published at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS for
the evolution of the effective Federal Funds rate.
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The second ingredient is a deadweight cost of default on the price of fore-
closed housing. So far, the only deadweight cost in the model (κ) is in-
curred on the income of the defaulting household. This is an idiosyncratic
cost that the defaulting household alone bears, and it is included only to
prevent default from being too attractive to an individual borrower. It can
be thought of capturing for example legal costs, loss of access to the credit
market after default, or loss of reputation after default.
On top of this idiosyncratic deadweight cost, I now impose a cost of de-
fault on the aggregate housing stock, which depends on the aggregate
default rate in the economy. It can be thought of capturing the fact that
foreclosed housing often sells at a big discount relative to market prices,
reflecting a pecuniary externality of default on housing. This element cap-
tures the “bust” in the house price cycle.
6.1 The aggregate demand complementarity
I modify the value function of a homeowner by adding an aggregate de-
mand complementarity that depends on the aggregate homeownership
rate 1− pˆi.8 Specifically, the value function is now:
VH(pi; pˆi) =E[u(c1(y1, q1)) + v(h) + g(1− pˆi) | pi]
=p(pi)E[u(cnd(y1, q1)) + v(h) + g(1− pˆi) | pi]+
(1− p(pi))E[u(cd(y1)) + χv(h) | pi] (30)
In this formulation, g : [0, 1] → R is a strictly strictly increasing function
of the homeownership rate 1− pˆi with a slope 0 < g′(1− pˆi) < 1 ∀pˆi.
This implies a weak demand complementarity in homeownership. A slope
above one would imple a strong complementarity, which opens up the
possibility of equilibrium multiplicity. Beaudry et al. (2015) show that a
slope of the demand complementarity function below unity guarantees a
unique equilibrium, but can accommodate a deterministic cycle around
this equilibrium.
8This definition of the homeownership rate hinges on the continued assumption of
uniformly distributed types.
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A further assumption is that a tenant does not enjoy this demand comple-
mentarity. A tenant’s value function is thus unchanged from the baseline
formulation (6), reproduced here for convenience:
VR(pi) = E[u(cr(y1)) + χv(h) | pi]. (31)
The household’s value function is then:
V(pi; pˆi) = max{VH(pi; pˆi), VR(pi)}. (32)
In the numerical computations, I use the functional form
g(1− pˆi) = α log(1+ (1− pˆi))
where α > 0 is a parameter that governs the strength of the complementar-
ity. When pˆi = 1, i.e. the homeownership rate is zero, the demand comple-
mentarity equals zero as well. At the other extreme, when pˆi = 0, g attains
a maximum at α log(2). Setting 0 < α < 1 guarantees that 0 < g′(·) < 1
everywhere in the interval [0, 1].
The ex-post default choice and the ex-ante no-default probability p(pi; pˆi)
are modified accordingly and now also depend on the aggregate home
ownership rate. A borrower of type pi defaults in the second period if and
only if:
u(cd(y1)) + χv(h) > u(cnd(y1, q1)) + v(h) + g(1− pˆi).
6.2 The cost of default
The second extension to the baseline model is the inclusion of a dead-
weight cost of default on the house price. I now assume that each housing
unit seized and sold by the lender after a default suffers a cost 1− ψ pro-
portional to the market price q1, with 0 < ψ < 1. That is, a house h that
is foreclosed only yields ψq1h to the lender who sells it to a real estate
agent, and the real estate agent also receives ψq1h. The share (1− ψ)q1h is
lost. It represents a pecuniary externality – a haircut – on the share of the
aggregate housing stock that is foreclosed.
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Parameter Value Target Baseline Boom-bust
Demand complementarity α 0.99 - -
DWL cost on housing ψ 0.5 - - -
Safe interest rate R¯ 1.04 Safe interest rate 1.04 1.04
Utility from owner-occ. h vH(h) 0.12 Homeownership rate 0.66 0.80
Lender appropriation rate ξ 0.3 Average recovery rate 0.5 0.3
High house value prob. φ 0.915 Delinquency rate 0.03 0.034
Default DWL cost κ 2.11 Default only when (yL, qL) X X
q0/y0 2.94 Loan-to-value ratio 0.66 0.66
qH/q0 1.07 Peak-to-trend 1.07 1.07
qL/q0 0.24 Trough-to-trend 0.24 0.24
yH/y0 1.43 Relative income growth 1.43 1.43
yL/y0 0.71 Relative income loss 0.71 0.71
Table 5: Boom-bust parameter calibration. “Baseline” refers to the targeted equi-
librium values under the baseline calibration, replicated from Table 3. “Boom-bust” refers
to the equilibrium values under the boom-bust calibration, around which the system os-
cillates.
A homeowner who does not default on his loan is not subject to this cost,
and is able to sell his house at the market price q1h.
Denote by S the set of possible states of the world (y1, q1) and by S the
number of different states S . In particular, we have S = {(yH, qH), (yL, qH),
(yH, qL), (yL, qL)} and S = 4.
The value of the aggregate stock of housing of an exiting generation, q¯, is
then:
q¯ = f (p¯i, φ) (I− 1nd) q+ f (p¯i, φ) 1nd ψq (33)
where 1nd in a S × S diagonal matrix with elements iss = 1 if there is
default in state s and iss = 0 if there is not.
Furthermore, f (p¯i, φ) = [p¯iφ (1− p¯i)φ p¯i(1− φ) (1− p¯i)(1− φ)] (1×
S) is the joint distribution of the average income shock type pi on the
market and the house value shock φ, where p¯i ≡ E[pi |pi ≥ pˆi] = 1+pˆi2 .
Finally, q = [qH qL]′ is a S× 1 vector of house values.
This expression picks up the states in which default happens and dis-
counts the house values by ψ in those states, while the values remain
unaffected in the no-default states. It then computes the expected value
of the housing stock, which equals the ex-post average value of the stock
under the law of large numbers.
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Figure 6: Boom-bust model dynamics and the data. Panel (a): Model dynamics,
deviations from mean. Panel (b): Data, percentage deviations from mean or trend.
6.3 Parametrisation of the extended model
The behaviour of the model and the dynamics of the house price cycle
are very sensitive to the parameter values. The length, magnitude and
frequency of the deterministic cycle can vary significantly.
I do not attempt to make any quantitative claims on the nature and dy-
namics of house price cycles. Instead, I show below a specific example that
demonstrates that the model can, qualitatively, replicate a similar pattern
in house prices, default rate, and homeownership rate as observed in the
data in Figure 1.
The parametrisation mostly follows the baseline presented in Table 3 in
Section 4.4. The demand complementarity parameter α and the haircut
on house values ψ govern the behaviour on the cycle, and are chosen to
qualitatively match the cyclical patterns observed in Figure 1. The demand
complementarity strengthens the incentives for buying a house. The utility
from homeownership vH(h), the deadweight cost of default κ, and the
lender appropriation rate ξ are adjusted to dampen incentive to enter the
housing market, in order to mitigate the effect on the homeownership rate.
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6.4 Boom-bust dynamics
This section presents and discusses the dynamics of the model under the
parametrisation in Table 5, and compares these dynamics to the patterns
observed in data.
Panel (a) of Figure 6 plots the dynamics of the extended model. The model
exhibits a deterministic cycle of three periods around its equilibrium. All
variables are expressed in deviations from their mean values. Panel (b)
replicates the data from Figure 1; here, for ease of comparison with the
model counterparts, all series are either de-meaned or de-trended by re-
moving a linear trend.
The model dynamics work as follows. Imagine, first, a situation where the
purchase price of housing q0 and the homeownership rate 1− pˆi both are
low. This implies, at the same time, that the share of subprime borrowers
is low.
In the next period, cheap housing the attracts more buyers on the market.
In addition, because there were initially few subprime borrowers in the
market to start with, the default rate is low, and defaults do not impose
large discounts on house sales. Thus, the purchase price of housing in-
creases. At the same time, as homeownership is more attractive, the share
of subprime borrowers also increases.
In the next phase, because the average quality of borrowers deteriorated,
defaults start to go up, house prices are depressed, and homeownership
becomes less attractive. Subsequently, the cycle starts again from a state of
low house prices and low homeownership.
Qualitatively, the model matches the patterns observed in data remarkably
well. In particular, in the data, house prices peak in 2006. New mortgage
originations peak slightly earlier, in 2003, and remain elevated through
2006. Likewise, the share of subprime borrowing remains stable until 2003,
increases in 2004 and remains high during the mortgage boom in 2004–
2006, after which it collapses. The delinquency rate only picks up later: in
the data, this happens in 2009.
The model exhibits these same patterns. When house prices are rising,
homeownership increases; in the context of the model, this translates di-
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Ratio of standard errors Data Model
Loan originations to house prices 5.2 9.4
Subprime loan originations to all loan originations 0.02 0.44
Default rate to loan originations 0.045 0.042
Default rate to house prices 0.23 0.40
Table 6: Relative volatilities of the series in Figure 6. Note: measured as the
ratio of standard errors. “Model”: series in Panel (a), “Data”: series in Panel (b)
of Figure 6, respectively.
rectly into new loan originations. At the same time, the share of subprime
borrowers increases, as less creditworthy households are attracted into the
credit market. Homeownership peaks earlier than house prices. Finally,
as in the data, there is a lag between the peak in house prices and the peak
in defaults.
In terms of relative magnitudes, the model also performs very well. The
relative volatilities of the series in Figure 6 are presented in Table 6. All,
expect the volatility of subprime loans to all loans, are of the same order
of magnitude in both the data and the model.
Most notably, new loan originations are more volatile than house prices.
In the model, there are only two assets available to the household (the
safe deposit and the risky investment in housing), and moreover, the di-
versification of endowments into both assets is not optimal. Therefore
small changes in the price of the risky assets induce large fluctuations in
the households’ investment incentives, and consequently, the homeowner-
ship rate as well as the share of subprime borrowers. On the other hand,
as only a small fraction of borrowers default in any given period, only a
small fraction of the housing stock is subject to a haircut. There is no asset
price bubble or over-heating of the market that would lead to large swings
in house prices.
In the data, the changes in the homeownership rate are small (not depicted
in the figure here), but the volume of new residential mortgage loan orig-
inations grows 7-fold in absolute terms, or from 70% below mean to 120%
above mean over the boom period. This amount includes also refinanc-
ing and home equity loans, not only loans for new purchases, which are
strictly speaking absent in the model. Nonetheless, mortgages for new
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purchases amount to a substantial share of total mortgage originations.9
It has to be noted, however, that the fluctuations in the theoretical model
are very small in magnitude in absolute terms: they are weak oscillations
around the model equilibrium, much smaller in absolute magnitude than
the cycles observed in the data. The model is not intended to be a quan-
titative model of business or house price cycles; in order to work as such,
it would need more powerful mechanisms that induce aggregate fluctua-
tions. Here, all uncertainty is still idiosyncratic, and the fluctuations are
created by externalities stemming from the demand complementarity on
the one hand, and the default discount on the other hand.10
7 Conclusions
This papers outlines a model of the housing market where housing finance
is affected by an adverse selection problem. The selection is towards less
creditworthy borrowers, which implies equilibrium overborrowing with
respect to the first-best. Overborrowing must then be understood as a
macroeconomic problem, not an individual-level one: each household
chooses optimally to take on debt, and lenders choose optimally their loan
offers, but the market failure caused by hidden borrower types can lead to
too much debt in aggregate from a social point of view.
The first goal of this paper is to shed light on the micro-level mechanisms
and incentives that can cause equilibrium over-investment and endoge-
nous fluctuations in lending standards, captured by the endogenous share
of subprime borrowers in the market.
The second goal is to demonstrate how a combination of private infor-
mation, aggregate demand complementarities and deadweight costs of
default can create endogenous cycles in the housing market. These dy-
namics can help understand which factors contribute to the creation of
boom-bust cycles in housing markets.
9See e.g. the Mortgage Bankers Association (2016) for more detailed information on
mortgage origination by purpose.
10I have left out the scale of the y-axis in Panel (a) of Figure 6 in order to highlight the
qualitative patterns in the cycles generated by the model and observed in the data.
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The model, while simple, succeeds in replicating some key statistics of
long-run averages in the U.S. housing market before the subprime crisis,
such as the default rate, homeownership rate, and loan-to-income ratio.
The extended version of the model also captures qualitatively, in terms of
relative volatilities as well as in terms of timing of the credit and house
price cycles, the patterns observed in the U.S. data in 1990-2015. This time
period includes both the run-up to the subprime crisis, the peak of the
housing boom, and the subsequent collapse of the housing market.
Using comparative statics, I show that lending standards are loose and
there is a lot of overborrowing first, when future house values are expected
to be high, which leads to high purchase prices of housing; and second,
when safe interest rates are relatively low, which implies low costs of bor-
rowing as well as a low opportunity cost on housing investment. In these
circumstances, the incentives of not-very-creditworthy borrowers to enter
the credit market are the strongest: their outside returns are low, expected
capital gains on housing are high, and the cost of borrowing is low. These
are also the conditions which correlate with the greatest inefficiency in the
credit market, or in other words, with very loose lending standards.
These are exactly the circumstances which prevailed in the U.S. prior to
the subprime crisis in the early 2000s; the results are consistent with a
substantial market failure in housing finance in the years prior to the crisis.
They also demonstrate that there are strong and important links between
the conduct of monetary policy and financial stability.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. The homeowner consumption in the no-default
state cFBnd is increasing in pi:
∂cFBnd
∂pi = − ∂r(pi)∂pi l > 0, as:
∂r(pi)
∂pi
=
[
E[q1h + ξy1 | ’default’,pi]
l0
− (1+ r¯)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
p′(pi)
p(pi)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0.
The value VFBR (pi) = E[u(c
FB
r ) + χv(h)|pi] continuous and differantiable by
the assumptions made on u(·). It is linearly increasing in type pi:
∂VFBR (pi)
∂pi
= u(cFBr (yH))− u(cFBr (yL)) > 0
∂2VFBR (pi)
∂pi2
= 0.
The value VFBH (pi) = E[p(pˆi
FB)[u(cFBnd (pˆi
FB))+ v(h)]+ (1− p(pˆiFB))[u(cFBd )+
χv(h)] | pˆiFB] is not necessarily continuous and differentiable everywhere:
it can exhibit discontinuous jumps. To see this, define default sets D(pi)
as the set of states s ∈ S in which a borrower of type pi ex-post finds it
optimal to default:
D(pi) ≡ {s ∈ S | u(cFBd (ys1;pi)) + χv(h) > u(cFBnd (ys1, qs1;pi)) + v(h)},
where ys1 and q
s
1 denote the realisation of income y1 and house value q1
in a given state s. The default probability p(pi) is decreasing in pi, which
implies that pi > pi′ =⇒ D(pi) ⊆ D(pi′). In other words higher types
cannot default in strictly more states than lower types; high types are by
definition more likely to realise favourable states with y1 = yH. Finally,
when the set of states S is a discrete set, either D(pi) = D(pi′) ∀pi,pi′, or
D(pi) ⊂ D(pi′) for some pi = pi′ + e for an arbitrarily small e > 0. In
the former case, all types default in exactly the same states, and VFBH (pi) is
continuous and differentiable in pi. In the latter case, there are discontin-
uous jumps at cut-off types where the switch from a default set D(pi′) to
a smaller one D(pi) ⊂ D(pi′) happens.
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However, because utility u(·) is increasing in consumption by assumption,
consumption in the no-default state is increasing in pi, consumption in the
default state is constant in the type pi, and the no-default probability is
increasing in pi, it follows that expected utility is increasing in pi. This
directly implies that VFBH (pi) is always increasing in pi, also at any possible
discontinuity points.
Then, there exists a parametrisation (specific functional forms and a set
of parameter values) for which the value functions VFBR (pi) and V
FB
H (pi)
intersect at most once in the interval pi ∈ [0, 1]. If no intersection exists
in this interval, if VFBR (pi) < V
FB
H (pi) ∀p, define pˆiFB = 0, and if VFBR (pi) >
VFBH (pi) ∀pi, define pˆiFB = 1. I assume that the parametrisation is such that
I can rule out cases where the value functions could intersect more than
once. 
Proof of proposition 2. Similarly to the symmetric information case, the
value of a tenant VR(pi) is linearly increasing in pi:
∂VH(pi)
∂pi
= u(cr(yH))− u(cr(yL)) > 0
The value of a home-owner VH(pi) is increasing in pi is increasing follow-
ing the same argument as VFBH (pi), presented in the proof of Proposition 1
above. Then, there exists a parametrisation (specific functional forms and
a set of parameter values) for VR(pi) and VH(pi) such that they intersect at
most once in the interval pi ∈ [0, 1]. If no intersection exists in this interval
and VR(pi) < VH(pi) ∀pi, define pˆi = 0, and if VR(pi) > VH(pi) ∀pi, define
pˆi = 1. 
A.2 Numerical solution algorithm
The numerical method for finding the equilibrium under a given parametri-
sation and functional forms is an iteration algorithm based on guessing
and iterating on an interest rate until convergence. The algorithm searches
for an equilibrium through backward induction, starting from solving the
second-period problem of the consumer given the guess for the interest
rate, and given this solution, solving the first-period problems of the con-
sumer and the lender. The algorithm proceeds as follows.
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1. Guess for an equilibrium interest rate r∗.
2. Compute consumption profiles in all different states in t = 1 and the
utilities u(c) from these consumption profiles given the guess for r∗.
3. Compute the ex-post default decision in t = 1 of each type pi for all
realisations (y1, q1).
4. Given the ex-post default choices, compute the ex-ante private de-
fault probabilities, expected values VH and VR, and tenure choices in
t = 0.
5. Find the cut-off type pˆi who is indifferent between the expected val-
ues VH and VR given the guess r∗.
6. Given the guess r∗ and the borrower pool defined by pˆi implied by
the guess, compute the lenders’ expected profit.
7. If the lenders’ expected profit is not equal to the outside return on
funds, adjust the guess r∗ and iterate until convergence.
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